Day 1,670 and Counting: Women’s Rights under De Facto Rule in Afghanistan
With over 70 decrees and a penal code that legalizes domestic violence, the Taliban have built a governance system that demands legal accountability.
By: Madina Shahab
Afghanistan has become a graveyard for women's rights. Under the current de facto authorities in Afghanistan, women have been stripped of their basic rights and freedoms, including the right to liberty, security, movement, education, and meaningful participation in public life. Although Afghanistan remains formally a State Party to multiple international human rights treaties, these sustained and institutionalized violations have continued for the past 1,670 days.
The Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 reversed two decades of institutional, legal, and social progress in Afghanistan. Upon regaining control, the de facto authorities reshaped Afghanistan’s state apparatus, abolished the 2004 Constitution, dissolved democratic institutions, and restructured government ministries. Authority now centralizes under the Taliban’s Supreme Leader, Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, and Chief of Justice, Abdul Hakim Haqqani — both of whom are subject to arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity, including the systematic gender-based persecution of women and girls.
In September 2021, the Ministry of Women Affairs (MOWA) was formally dissolved and replaced with the Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (MPVPV). Supported by its subsidiary Departments for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (DPVPVs). They function as a nationwide moral enforcement authority, issuing decrees and directives regulating public and private conduct under the Taliban’s interpretation of Sharia law.
Afghanistan carries clear legal obligations under international law, especially on women’s rights, as the country remains a formal State Party to binding international treaties, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).
These treaties require States Parties not only to prevent and prohibit inhuman treatment of women and girls, but also to actively adopt legislative, administrative, and institutional measures to protect against discrimination.
A change in regime doesn’t absolve a state of its international legal obligations. Under the principle of continuity of the state, international treaty obligations remain binding regardless of who holds power. All states are also bound by Customary International Law, which operates independently of treaty ratification.
The 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action affirms that, “it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Therefore, Afghanistan’s international obligations stand, regardless of who holds power.
Since 2021, the Taliban have issued and implemented over 70 decrees that systematically curtail the rights of Afghan women and girls. Today, over 2.2 million girls are barred from attending school beyond the primary level, which is a direct breach of Article 10 of CEDAW, Article 13 of ICESCR, and Article 28 of the CRC.
In 2022, the Taliban mandated strict dress codes; women were barred from parks and gyms; and women were prohibited from working with NGOs. By 2023, that ban was extended to United Nations entities, and beauty salons were ordered to close — violations of Article 11 and Article 7 of CEDAW, and Article 25 of the ICCPR.
In January 2026, the Taliban announced a new Criminal Procedure Code for Courts, which entrenched a discriminatory framework regarding violence against women. Article 32 of the Penal Code restricts criminal liability by “allowing husbands to physically punish (beat) their wives and children with a stick as long as there is no visible sign of broken bones or open wounds.”
Article 34 stipulates that a woman who repeatedly visits her father or other relatives without her husband’s permission, or who refuses to return when requested by him, may face a prison sentence of up to three months. This penal code contains no explicit prohibition on physical, psychological, and sexual violence against women and girls — contravening Articles 1, 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 5(a) of CEDAW and Article 19 of the CRC.
With the new penal code in place, courts no longer operate impartially. Gender discrimination isn’t incidental to the system; rather, it is the system. The data reinforces what these policies look like on the ground. According to a UN Women 2024 Gender Index report, “women attain just 23.7 percent of the outcomes achieved by Afghan men across key human development indicators,” indicating a 76.3 percent gender gap.
To enforce compliance, the Taliban have relied on a classic command-and-control model of regulation, with rules imposed hierarchically and backed by sanctions. This produces enforceable consequences designed to compel behavioural conformity and allows the Taliban to consolidate control and enforce their policies without relying on procedural mechanisms such as public consultation or advisory bodies. Skipping those procedural tools enables swift decision-making while reinforcing their centralized power. It also lets them implement and advance their ideological objectives without compromise.
The newly enacted penal code is the regime’s most consequential regulatory instrument — it translates governance priorities into binding legal standards and channels enforcement through the courts. By codifying restrictions on women’s movement and voice into law, the regime makes women a primary target of regulation, framing women’s public presence as something to be controlled and legitimizing heightened surveillance and punishment.
The regime grounds these regulatory measures in its interpretation of Sunni Hanafi jurisprudence within Sharia law. Sharia, derived from the Qur’an, Hadith, juristic consensus (ijma), and analogical reasoning (qiyas), functions as a credible source of law in many Muslim-majority states; however, it is not a singular codified legal system. Its application depends on human interpretation (fiqh), and its meaning varies significantly across different schools of Islamic jurisprudence.
What the Taliban have done is take one contested interpretation and convert it into enforceable law. For example, the Taliban frequently invoke Surah An-Nisa, 4:34 to justify male authority over women, domestic violence and restrictions on women’s public participation. However, this verse is deeply contested within Islamic legal scholarship, and its meaning has been interpreted differently across historical periods, legal traditions, and national contexts.
The Taliban’s de facto governance systematically breaches Afghanistan’s international obligations, particularly under CEDAW, ICCPR, ICESCR, CRC, and CAT. That is why a Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA) in Afghanistan is necessary and urgent. An HRBA requires that laws and institutions be measured against international legal obligations and against the lived realities of those most affected. It asks who is being excluded, who is being harmed, and whose rights are being treated as negotiable. Placing women’s rights, participation, and dignity at the center of governance isn’t optional; it’s the standard.