Biden's 'multilateralism' is dangerously isolationist

Joe Biden has vowed to renew America’s relationships with its allies, but poor execution risks further damaging those relationships and isolating the United States

Jason Kreutz is a graduate student at McGill University’s Max Bell School of Public Policy. He is the Vice-President Academic of the Public Policy Association of Graduate Students and an editor at The Bell. Jason’s interests include economic, health, and foreign policy. His views and opinions are his own.

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FROM THE MOMENT HE ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION to run for president of the United States, Joe Biden vowed to abandon Donald Trump’s “America First” mantra and restore America’s position as a leader on the world stage. These provisions included renewing bonds with old allies and forging new alliances alike. So far, the results of Biden’s promise have been mixed, and at times conflicting. Nowhere in the world can we better observe how Biden’s commitment is playing out than in the South China sea.

The announcement of the AUKUS agreement this past September – a trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States centred on helping Australia procure nuclear powered submarines – appears to be a step in the right direction for Biden. The AUKUS initiative makes no mention of China, but it is apparent that this pact is a cornerstone of America’s larger China strategy.

On the surface, AUKUS exemplifies America’s renewed commitment to working with other nations on matters of foreign policy and global security. While this agreement has captured the attention of the world and has predictably angered Beijing, which lays claim to much territory in the South China Sea, it also enraged France, a long standing American ally and NATO member. The AUKUS accord, hailing the promise of American nuclear submarines and increased cybersecurity and intelligence collaboration between the three member nations, was effectively responsible for sinking a submarine contract established in 2016 between Australia and France. This contract, like AUKUS, was brokered as a strategic-partnership between the two nations. Also analogous to AUKUS, this agreement laid the foundation for French ambitions to expand their presence in the Indo-Pacific region. The Élysées already patrols the South China Sea and has several million citizens living in its Indo-Pacific territories.

While AUKUS does not pose a dire threat to France’s national defence or defence industry, it has nonetheless fostered feelings of shock and resentment. The real concern lies with America’s (and Australia’s) relationship with France. At multiple meetings with representatives from Canberra and Washington, the most recent occurring about two weeks prior to the announcement of AUKUS,, Paris had no inkling that its submarine agreement was in jeopardy. As put by French foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, “Allies don’t do this to each other.” France’s Indo-Pacific strategy has been upended, but prevailing sentiments of betrayal and discontent will also strain America’s own relations with France and hamper its soft power. France’s perception of America as undependable and erratic has been reinforced and will harm Biden’s multilateral efforts for the foreseeable future.

The Biden administration’s lack of foresight regarding France’s anger is not only negligent and careless; it directly undermines American efforts to turn a new leaf with their international relationships. Le Drian dubbed AUKUS a “stab in the back” and has said that the AUKUS members are at fault for “lying, duplicity, a major breach of trust and contempt”. Underscoring the gravity of this transgression, the French ambassadors to Australia and the United States were recalled for the first time in over two-hundred years. The reasons for excluding France from AUKUS remain unclear.

AUKUS further validates an existing French notion that Europe requires greater strategic autonomy and “European Sovereignty”, meaning that Europe needs to be less reliant upon the United States. The Biden Administration has done little to soothe the tensions created with France over this deal. Coupled with the collapse of the internationally backed government in Afghanistan, Biden’s administration looks seemingly unable to anticipate the repercussions of its own geopolitical strategy.

America simply cannot afford to make strategic decisions that overlook the grievances of its allies. America’s military alliances, including NATO, AUKUS, The Quad, and a defensive pact with Taiwan, while different in scope, must not be at odds. While The Quad, a strategic network between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, was established over a decade ago and left much to be desired, Biden has breathed new life into this alliance by hosting the first in-person meeting for the group. The success of The Quad will depend in large part on America's ability to set concrete objectives that complement, rather than interfere, with other strategic agreements.  

As China increases its military and economic might, the growing threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan under the “One China” policy demands greater strategic coordination. Taiwan, and other countries within the South China Sea vicinity, could be incorporated within The Quad or another multilateral strategic framework. The Biden Administration has explicitly reaffirmed America’s commitment to defending Taiwan, and thus it would be a logical next step to expand Taiwan’s geopolitical clout and safety through such a framework. Such a move would be received extremely negatively by Beijing, but a united front is the best deterrent against aggression and is an assurance of both regional and global stability.

Greater attention to the interplay between America’s commitments will ensure that multilateral efforts are coherent and successful. This will ultimately bolster the power and security of America and its allies in the long term. Likewise, America must take the same approach for non-military alliances, such as the Five Eyes intelligence alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Greater strategic alignment is warranted if Biden wishes to maintain America’s role as a global leader.

Joe Biden and the democratic party face a swath of political challenges. Domestically, Biden’s approval ratings are wilting, talk of inflation and rising prices are pervasive, and the Democrats recently suffered a crushing blow in the Virginia gubernatorial race. Internationally, America’s leading role on the world stage is in question. In an era where the dominance of American and western power is being fundamentally challenged, Joe Biden needs a coherent and organized multilateral China policy to maintain influence abroad and to secure the support of voters at home. (JK)

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The Bell is edited by Jaclyn Victor, Jason Kreutz, Shweta Menon and Phaedra de Saint-Rome of the Max Bell School of Public Policy at McGill University.