Canada and the G7 need a more focused sanctions strategy
The proliferation of symbolic sanctions that are difficult to enforce undermines their effectiveness and popularity.
By Michael Black
Currently, Canada imposes sanctions on 24 countries, as well as several interstate terrorist groups and individuals linked to corruption or human rights violations. Historically, these were primarily implementations of UN security council resolutions, which Canada has a legal obligation to implement. In more recent years, Canada has increasingly imposed “autonomous” sanctions, brought in by choice, in coordination with allies: every Canadian sanction regime has an equivalent in the US or EU, though the timing or exact perimeter may differ. As they have gained prominence, sanctions have exhibited some weaknesses and attracted increased criticism, most notably from the BRICS+ grouping. In the wake of these developments, Canada’s sanctions policy merits re-evaluation.
As the most significant player in the global financial system, the US has a preeminent role in the imposition of sanctions globally, but coordination across the G7 is essential to maximize their effectiveness. When done right, economic sanctions allow a swift response to human rights violations or security threats. This was the case with the sanctions imposed on Russia after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. While the impact did not live up to some hyperbolic claims made early on in the conflict, these sanctions have reduced Russian GDP relative to where it would have been otherwise and harmed Russia’s military industry, undermining its ability to wage war effectively. These benefits and seemingly low cost have led to a proliferation of autonomous sanctions over the last 20 years, with the US leading the charge.
Yet many sanctions do not have any meaningful economic effect, often because they are difficult or impossible to implement. These sanctions serve a mostly symbolic purpose, by “naming and shaming” perpetrators of human rights abuses, with the sense that doing this through sanctions is more impactful than an empty diplomatic declaration. Symbolism matters, but when sanctions are not imposed effectively, the outcome is often no better than an empty diplomatic statement and can even be harmful. While they are easy to implement for governments, sanctions are not cost-free, as they impose costs on the private sector – primarily banks – feeding the growth of a multi-billion dollar compliance industry. They can also actively harm some of the people they are trying to assist, by making it difficult for humanitarian organizations to operate in the places they are most needed. In some cases, the sanctions provoke popular backlash against those imposing the sanctions, which can go as far as to politically reinforce the very actors who are supposed to be weakened by the measures. Once the initial shock passes, a target may eventually accept sanctions as a “new normal”.
While an expansion of the scope and enforcement of sanctions may intuitively be thought to reinforce their impact, the opposite may actually be true — both by reinforcing the previously mentioned drawbacks and also because of their symbolism. Even when they are limited in impact, they affect a large number of countries which are concentrated in the global south. In these nations sanctions are viewed as arbitrary, which drives unpopularity of sanctions and the global north nations who impose them. This criticism (especially of American secondary sanctions) was center stage at last month’s BRICS summit, making its way into the final Kazan declaration. A large part of this trend is driven by the targets of sanctions themselves, notably Russia, but it also finds a lot of resonance across countries that are not affected by G7 sanctions or might otherwise be seen as generally aligned with the West. Ever broader imposition of sanctions, even when the impact is primarily symbolic, only serves to reinforce this criticism. While antagonism from the targets of sanctions is to be expected, this sentiment is more widespread than that. The wide scope of sanctions unnecessarily antagonizes a large part of the world, with relatively little to show for it.
Sanctions can be a tempting policy tool to show that Canada, or the G7 more broadly, is acting. But ultimately there is no such thing as a cost-free sanction. Importantly, sanctions cannot be a replacement for broader investment in security, such as meeting NATO’s target of spending 2% of GDP on defense. Sanctions do have value and can be impactful, but they are not a magic wand and should not be overused. They should be focused on a more limited set of cases in pursuit of specific, clearly defined objectives. Once implemented, these should be actively monitored and adjusted as the situation changes. Finally, Canada should also engage further in “sanctions diplomacy,” to improve the global public perception of sanctions and limit circumvention. A clearer and more restricted focus in conjunction with diplomatic efforts can help to make sanctions more effective while increasing their acceptability globally.
Michael Black is a Deputy Editor of The Bell. He grew up in Paris and later moved to Montreal to study Political Science and History at McGill University. After his studies, he went on to work as a Monitoring & Evaluation Officer for Civipol, where he contributed to an EU-funded project focused on combating money laundering across Africa. With a strong background in political analysis and international development, Michael is excited to pursue a Master’s in Public Policy at the Max Bell school to develop his skills and contribute to innovative policies that strengthen international cooperation and improve governance.