The F-35, and Then What?

Canadian leaders’ promises to review F-35 fighter jet procurement leave many open questions. European allies may have the answers.

The Gripen fighter jet. From Saab.

By Michael Black

Defence has taken on an unusually prominent role in Canada’s political conversation at a time when our relationship with the United States has come under scrutiny and emerged as a focal point in electoral debates. The controversial F-35 fighter jet procurement is once again in the spotlight following Mark Carney’s commitment to review Canada’s purchase of the American-made aircraft. The question of whether or not to acquire the F-35 has been the subject of a long-running debate in Canada. With a recent Nanos poll showing that 60 per cent of Canadians support cancelling the contract, it remains a salient issue for voters. This debate has often focused on dependence on the United States or concerns about the cost. However, this neglects the fact that the current contract leaves Canada with no clear role in developing a sixth-generation fighter, which risks locking the country into further dependence.

Critics have often pointed to the F-35’s significant dependence on the United States as a major vulnerability. Indeed, the United States restricts maintenance and upgrades outside its borders and the plane relies on cloud-based American software. While there is no outright “kill switch,” this does mean that F-35 clients rely on the supplier, American company Lockheed Martin, far more than is typical for most fighter jets. This is an increasingly important concern at a time when the American president has openly questioned Canada’s — and others’ — sovereignty.

While Mark Carney has called for a review of the F-35 purchase, Canada remains committed to acquiring at least the first 16 of a planned 88 jets. This means that the RCAF will be receiving F-35s, but this review does allow the RCAF to operate a second model of fighter jet alongside its F-35s, in a mixed fleet. Such an approach would mitigate sovereignty concerns by ensuring there is no single point of failure in Canada’s air combat capabilities, reducing Canada’s vulnerability to external political pressures.

Despite the risk of overreliance on the United States, Canada has opted against alternatives that prioritized sovereignty. The current F-35 contract was concluded following a competitive process in which Saab’s Gripen, produced in Sweden, placed second. A key selling point of Saab’s offering was a promise of greater Canadian sovereignty over the aircraft, alongside industrial offsets including final assembly in Canada. The Gripen appears to remain under consideration, as Saab’s CEO has confirmed ongoing discussions with the Canadian government.

Beyond immediate considerations, Canada must also consider long-term industrial and strategic interests. While Canada is still litigating the procurement of its fifth-generation fighter jet, allies move ahead with sixth-generation fighter programs — most notably the FCAS (Future Combat Air System led by France, Germany, Spain) and GCAP (Global Combat Air Programme led by UK, Japan, Italy). Canada risks being left behind. Unlike its involvement in F-35 production, Canada currently has no role in any sixth-generation initiative.

Choosing a mixed fleet now, particularly one that includes a platform made by countries participating in the FCAS or GCAP could create opportunities for longer-term collaboration and ensure Canada maintains a stake in the next generation of aerospace innovation. This strategy aligns with the newly announced Liberal Party defence policy, which prioritizes strengthening Canada’s domestic defence industry and advancing Canada’s participation in the ReArm Europe Plan.

In the original competition, Dassault’s Rafale (from France) and the Eurofighter Typhoon (from the UK, Germany and Italy) withdrew, arguing that NORAD requirements prevented non-American aircraft from being competitive. However, since Canada is already committed to buying F-35s, these can be assigned to the NORAD mission, making these European fighter jets more appealing candidates in the context of a mixed fleet strategy. Moreover, selecting either the Rafale or Eurofighter would better align with Canada's strategic interest in participating in future aerospace innovation, given that France, Germany, Italy, and the UK are central players in Europe's sixth-generation fighter initiatives—FCAS and GCAP—while Sweden has only a limited involvement in GCAP.

Defenses of the F-35 purchase often raise the issue of interoperability with the US Air Force. However, all three potential additions — Rafale, Eurofighter, and Gripen — are NATO aircraft built with interoperability in mind. All three have flown alongside U.S. aircraft in NATO missions and the Rafale-M is even certified to operate from U.S. carriers. Additionally, in a mixed fleet scenario, the RCAF would still have F-35s for NORAD and other missions.

As for cost, while a mixed fleet does pose logistical challenges, it also introduces flexibility. Each of these European jets is less expensive to operate than the F-35, and countries like Germany, Italy, and Greece are already planning or executing mixed fleet strategies to diversify capabilities and contain costs. Canada should not fear following suit.

Ultimately, the debate is not about replacing the F-35. It is about avoiding overreliance. A mixed fleet strategy would allow Canada to fulfill its NORAD obligations while reinforcing its sovereignty, economic resilience, and strategic partnerships. More importantly, it opens the door for Canadian industry to play a role in the next generation of fighter aircraft — an opportunity that will be lost if we place all our bets on a single platform made abroad. A fleet that doesn’t rely solely on the U.S. is a more secure, independent, and forward-looking one.

Michael Black is a Deputy Editor of The Bell. He grew up in Paris and later moved to Montreal to study Political Science and History at McGill University. After his studies, he went on to work as a Monitoring & Evaluation Officer for Civipol, where he contributed to an EU-funded project focused on combating money laundering across Africa.