Could Russia's invasion of Ukraine be replicated by China in Taiwan?
Xi might wish to duplicate Putin’s approach to Ukraine, however, the case in the Taiwan Strait is fundamentally different.
Pangying Peng is an off-duty Taiwanese diplomat currently pursuing the public policy master’s program at the Max Bell School of Public Policy, McGill University. This article only reflects his personal views and life experiences in Taiwan and does NOT represent the Taiwanese government’s stance by any means.
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BY EMPLOYING BLITZKRIEG IN UKRAINE, President Putin is showing Chinese President Xi Jinping how to seize land with a surprise attack and a rapid, overwhelming force concentration. While Ukraine’s perseverant resistance has crushed Russia’s dream of promptly subjugating the country and dragged it into the mire of a full-blown war, Beijing could still regard Russia’s approach as a model that merits emulation in its ambitions toward Taiwan, however, the dissimilarities between the two cases should be given due consideration. Beijing has spent decades attempting to craft military plans enabling its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to carry out a swift strike, landing and control of Taiwan—a de facto independent island that Beijing considers a renegade province with the intent of establishing a fait accompli of reunification before the West and Japan come to its aid. As we examine other similarities with Russia and Ukraine, we begin to understand their effects aren’t easily transferable to China and Taiwan.
The similarities do inspire Xi to run risks. The relations between Taiwan and China are as intertwined as those between Ukraine and Russia. Geographic proximity and a shared history and language come to the fore. While Taiwan is an island situated at least 125km away from China, there are two unique islets— “Kinmen” and “Matsu,” located near the southeast coast of the Chinese mainland—they have been controlled by the Taiwanese government since the civil war ended on the Chinese mainland in 1949. They are geographically closer to China than Taiwan and during the Cold War, they were regarded as the frontline of the Capitalist Bloc. Communist China sought to occupy Kinmen in 1949 and 1958 but was repelled by the Taiwanese Armed Forces. Nonetheless, since China opened its economy in 1978 and Taiwan implemented the opening policy to Chinese tourists in 2008, their economies have grown integrated with Xiamen and Fuzhou, the nearest cities of China. In the current context, the state of the two islets is akin to Donetsk and Luhansk of Ukraine.
Apart from the geographic proximity, there is also a strong component of shared history in China’s claim to reunify Taiwan. Just as Putin justified his cause to invade Ukraine by emphasizing Ukraine’s blood ties to Russia, and its role as an inalienable part of Russian history, culture and spiritual space, China also adopts identical rhetoric to whitewash its aggression against, and planned annexation of Taiwan. Like some pro-Russia Ukrainians, there also exist some pro-China political and business elites inside Taiwan, who constantly echo Beijing’s narrative by appealing to blood ties and peace. Whereas Ukraine has been widely recognized as an independent state in the UN and has established extensive diplomatic relations since the disintegration of Soviet Union, Taiwan is only recognized by 14 UN member states and has been otherwise excluded from the UN since China’s accession in 1971. Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation gives Beijing another plausible reason to justify its reunification efforts.
Russia’s ire at Ukraine’s intent to join NATO is equivalent to China’s rage over Taiwan’s growing support secured from the U.S., EU, Japan and Australia. In comparison to Russia, China is an economic superpower, which could forestall most economic sanctions from the West. Should Russia succeed in taking over more Ukrainian territory, China will be further spurred to advance its Taiwan agenda. For Putin and Xi, the conception that history and geography should prevail over self-determination and democracy is sacrosanct, no matter what democratic future Ukraine and Taiwan aspire to.
Yet, the dissimilarities might dismay Xi—Taiwan is not Ukraine, after all. First, geographic proximity could be exploited as a pretext to claim Taiwan, but the geographic reality that there exists a deep and turbulent strait between Taiwan and China is a checkmate. Unlike Ukraine which directly borders Russia and is thus easy to invade, Taiwan has a natural barrier. Even if the PLA could cross the strait, the landing would be problematic. In the report “Hostile Harbors: Taiwan’s Ports and PLA Invasion Plans,” published by the Project 2049 Institute, a Washington-based think tank, Senior Director Ian Easton indicated the onerous task of conducting amphibious warfare on Taiwan. Coming back to Kinmen and Matsu, the public opinions there have never revealed any dominant intent to join China as opposed to Donetsk and Luhansk, who had expressed possible interest in joining Russia.
Second, the U.S. and Japan’s geopolitical interests in Taiwan incentivise them to intervene in the Taiwan Strait if China crosses the red line. Taiwan finds itself at the midpoint of the U.S.-defined First Island Chain; its takeover by China would turn the Taiwan strait into an inland sea, directly cutting off the energy supply routes for Japan and South Korea.
Economic and political differences between Taiwan and Ukraine are also prominent. Economically, Taiwan’s global standing in the high-tech supply chain also provides the island a strong shield. The world’s overdependence on Taiwan for its advanced microchips, which power iPhones, MacBooks, 5G equipment, AI, and missiles, presents a strong incentive for the U.S. to protect Taiwan, especially considering that the top American chipmakers have been lacking the capability to fabricate smaller chips. Though cut off from obtaining the high-end chips from Taiwan by the U.S., China remains dependent on Taiwan for mid- and low-end chips destined for manufacturing lower-end chips used for appliances such as dishwashers and fridges., attacking Taiwan is synonymous with suicide for its industrial upgrading. This provides a “silicon shield” to Taiwan. In addition, Taiwan has constantly been among America’s top 10 trading partners, whereas Ukraine only ranks around 67th.
Politically, the U.S. has the underlying domestic Taiwan Relations Act on which to base its actions towards Taiwan, whereas Ukraine is not part of any U.S.-led military alliance. Bipartisan consensus to support Taiwan, characterized by a host of bills passed in the Congress in recent years, might also herald U.S. intervention in case of China’s aggression.
On February 28, 2022, President Biden sent a delegation of former U.S. defense and national security officials to Taiwan to reaffirm the American commitment amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Above all, alongside purchasing vast weaponry from the U.S. the Taiwanese government has been advancing its defence capabilities and autonomy over the years. Its military remains powerful at the global level and maintains one of the densest surface-to-air missile systems in the world. Taiwan also has a stable, and robust democracy, ranked 8th globally according to The Economist’s latest Democracy Index. Sound democracy keeps Taiwan resilient to China’s saber-rattling. All these dissimilarities manifest the impracticability for Xi to replicate Putin’s blitzkrieg approach.
Nothing, though, is guaranteed. No matter how much support Taiwan and Ukraine can gain from the West, the awareness and practice of self-defence should be the primary tenet for survival. Peace never relies on the goodwill of enemies, but on a people’s own strengths. This is also what Xi fears most about Taiwan. Ukrainians have proven that by withstanding Russia’s first wave of attack. Their determination to protect their homes has gradually driven the EU to dismiss appeasement. While diplomacy should be prioritised in transnational conflicts, one should likewise acknowledge that unchecked and powerful autocrats can evidently rip up any signed international agreement whenever they deem necessary.
As the deceased British PM Thatcher used to say, “aggressors attack because they think they are going to win, and they are more likely to attack the weak than the strong.” Although Taiwan differs from Ukraine, this principle is applicable just as much for Putin on Ukraine, as for Xi on Taiwan.
The Bell is edited by Jaclyn Victor, Jason Kreutz, Shweta Menon and Phaedra de Saint-Rome of the Max Bell School of Public Policy at McGill University.